Market Efficiency and Rationality: The Peculiar Case of Baseball by Thaler, Richard H. & Sunstein, Cass R.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 102 Issue 6 
2004 
Market Efficiency and Rationality: The Peculiar Case of Baseball 
Richard H. Thaler 
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business 
Cass R. Sunstein 
University of Chicago Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Market Efficiency and Rationality: The Peculiar Case of Baseball, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 1390 (2004). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol102/iss6/18 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
MARKET EFFICIENCY AND RATIONALITY: 
THE PECULIAR CASE OF BASEBALLt 
Richard H. Thaler* and Cass R. Sunstein** 
MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME. By Michael 
Lewis. New York: W.W. Norton. 2003. Pp . ix, 288. $24.95. 
In this lively book, Michael Lewis1 explores a topic that would 
seem of interest only to sports fans: how Billy Beane, the charismatic 
general manager of the Oakland Athletics, turned his baseball team 
around using, of all things, statistics. What next - an inspirational tale 
about superior database management? But there are some general 
lessons in Lewis's book that make it worth the attention of people who 
do not know the difference between a slider and a screwball (a group 
that, unfortunately, includes many lawyers and law professors). Those 
lessons have to do, above all, with the limits of human rationality and 
the efficiency of labor markets. If Lewis is right about the blunders 
and the confusions of those who run baseball teams, then his tale has a 
lot to tell us about blunders and confusions in many other domains. In 
that sense, the tale bears directly on continuing debates about 
behavior, cognition, and law.2 
I. MEASURING PERFORMANCE 
Lewis focuses on the extraordinary success of Beane, who has 
produced a terrific baseball team despite one of the lower payrolls in 
baseball. Since 1999, when Beane took over, the Athletics have 
t This review is a significantly revised and expanded version of Who's On First, 
originally published in The New Republic; the relevant parts are reprinted by permission. 
* Robert P. Gwinn Professor of Economics and Behavioral Science, University of 
Chicago Graduate School of Business. B.A. 1967, Case Western Reserve; Ph.D. 1974, 
University of Rochester. - Ed. 
** Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of 
Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science. A.B. 1975, J.D. 1978, Harvard. -
Ed. 
1. Journalist and popular author, whose other works include the national best-seller 
Liar's Poker and articles in numerous national periodicals. 
2. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2000). For 
critical discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM (William M. 
Landes & J. Mark Ramseyer eds., 2003), and RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL 
THEORY (2001). 
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compiled an amazing record. In 1999, the Athletics ranked eleventh 
(out of fourteen teams) in the American League in payroll and fifth in 
wins. In 2000, the Athletics ranked twelfth in payroll and second in 
wins, a feat that they duplicated in 2001. In 2002, the last year covered 
in the book, they ranked twelfth in payroll again - and first in wins. 
This past season, 2003, was yet another division-winning season with a 
cheap payroll. 
How did Beane pull this off? He did it largely by ignoring or 
defying baseball's conventional wisdom, otherwise known in baseball 
lingo as The Book. (As in, "The Book says that you should bunt in this 
situation.") It turns out that many chapters of The Book are simply 
wrong. Sacrifice bunts are rarely a good strategy, and steals are vastly 
overrated. (Unless a base stealer succeeds at least two-thirds of the 
time, his running efforts reduce runs scored rather than increase 
them.3) The portion of The Book that was most in need of revision, 
and the most important edge that Beane was able to exploit, involved 
player evaluation. Here he tried to figure out, statistically, how much a 
player was likely to contribute to his team's chances of winning. If he 
couldn't measure a factor or its impact, he dismissed it as subjective. 
Beane found that, as a statistical regularity, players drafted out of 
high school are much less likely to succeed than players drafted out of 
college (p. 16). And so he drafted no high school players, regardless of 
how highly they were touted. He hired a young assistant named Paul 
DePodesta, a Harvard economics graduate, who relied on his 
computer to project players' performances, without so much as ever 
seeing a player swing a bat. Much of the tension, and the comedy, of 
Lewis's book comes from the conflict between Beane's and 
DePodesta's statistical methods of evaluation and the well-established 
strategies of experts who have scouted, played, and breathed baseball 
for decades. The verdict? Statistical methods outperform experts. 4 It's 
not even close. 
As Lewis tells the tale, Beane's particular approach has intensely 
personal foundations. Beane himself was a top high-school prospect, 
one of the most sought after in the nation. He was fast; he was tall; he 
was strong; he could hit the ball a mile. The baseball scouts loved him. 
As one of them admitted, "I never looked at a single statistic of Billy's. 
It couldn't have crossed my mind . . .  He had it all" (p. 9). According 
to those who watched him, "The boy had a body you could dream on. 
Ramrod-straight and lean but not so lean you couldn't imagine him 
filling out. And that face!" (p. 7). Beane was selected in the first round 
3. See JOHN THORN & PETE PALMER, THE HIDDEN GAME OF BASEBALL (1985). 
4. This is a general theme in social-science research. See, e.g., Robin Dawes et al., 
Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUmVE JUDGMENT 730 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); William Meadow & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Statistics, Not Expens, 51 DUKE L.J. 629 (2001). 
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of the draft, with the highest of expectations. He was destined to be a 
star. 
There was just one problem: Beane did not play professional 
baseball very well. He thought too much. He was too emotional. His 
failures notwithstanding, baseball people saw his body, and his face, 
and his raw talent, and concluded that he was bound to succeed. 
"Teammates would look at Billy and see the future of the New York 
Mets. Scouts would look at him and see what they had always seen . . .  
The body. The Good Face" (p. 47). He certainly had talent, and once 
in a while he would do something truly sensational. But after several 
years in major league baseball, his performance was woefully bad. 
With only 301 at-bats, he hit .219; more embarrassingly, he had 80 
strikeouts and only 11 walks. Abruptly, he quit the game. While 
playing for Oakland, he told the team's general manager that he no 
longer wanted to be a player, and would prefer the job of advance 
scout, an employee who travels ahead of the team to analyze future 
opponents. The team's general manager was stunned: "Nobody does 
that. Nobody says, I quit as a player. I want to be an advance scout" 
(p. 55). 
Beane was a much better baseball analyst than baseball player, and 
he quickly moved up the Oakland club's hierarchy. He became 
interested in a simple question: What is the most efficient way to 
spend money on baseball players? The origins of Beane's iconoclastic 
answers can be found in the writings of Bill James, a once-obscure but 
now-legendary baseball writer/statistician. 5 While working as a night 
watchman for a pork-and-beans factory, James decided that he wanted 
to write about baseball in a way that would illuminate what really 
happened and why. In his view, conventional statistics were 
insufficiently helpful and sometimes downright misleading. Consider 
the area of defensive play. When a player mishandles a ball or makes a 
bad throw, he can be assigned an "error." A player who accumulates a 
lot of errors seems like a bad fielder, whereas one with few errors 
seems really good. The problem is that a player may accumulate errors 
in part because he is unusually good at getting to the ball. If you do 
not get to the ball, you are most unlikely to get an error (according to 
the chapter on scoring in The Book). So errors are a crude measure of 
fielding ability. 
Or consider walks. Since the late nineteenth century, walks have 
been treated, in official statistics, as neutral - neither good nor bad. 
According to a nineteenth-century expert whose advice is followed to 
the present day, "There is but one true criterion of skill at the bat, and 
that is the number of times bases are made on clean hits" (p. 70). Of 
5. For a good introduction to BiJI James, readers might try BILL JAMES, THE NEW BILL 
JAMES HISTORICAL BASEBALL ABSTRACT (2001). 
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course, many people realized that a walk is a positive event for the 
hitting team and a negative event for the team in the field, but this 
commonsense notion was not incorporated into baseball's most 
common measure of batting skill, the batting average, which leaves 
walks out. James found this preposterous, and he pushed for the use of 
the "on-base percentage" as an improvement. 
James also criticized the use of "runs batted in" as a standard 
measure of a hitter's value. James pointed out that some players are in 
a position to bat in a lot of runs because they either are lucky or play 
on good teams. Other players bat in fewer runs, but only because they 
do not have the opportunities of their apparent superiors: "There is a 
huge element of luck in even having the opportunity, and what wasn't 
luck was, partly, the achievement of others" (p. 71). 
Eventually James punctured countless myths about what was 
important to winning in baseball. And he had a positive agenda, too. 
He devised a formula to measure "runs created" - a formula that 
predicted, from just a few aspects of a player's performance, how 
many runs he would produce for an average team (p. 77). James's 
formula had explosive implications. It suggested that professional 
baseball experts, those who ran the teams, were placing far too much 
emphasis on batting averages and stolen bases, and far too little on 
walks and extra base hits. Statistical measures were moving actual 
decisions in a way that resulted in inferior team performance. After a 
slow start, James was widely read; his books became bestsellers, and 
he became a kind of cult figure among certain baseball fans. But for 
many years, baseball's experts and executives treated James's work as 
irrelevant. He had no effect on what they did. And with a few 
exceptions, the tried-but-not-so-true baseball statistics such as batting 
average and RBis remained the only ones reported. 
So Billy Beane, the "can't-miss" prospect who missed, became an 
avid Bill James reader. As Lewis writes, 
James had something to say specifically to Billy: you were on the 
receiving end of a false idea of what makes a successful baseball player. 
James also had something general to say to Billy, or any other general 
manager of a baseball team who had the guts, or the need, to listen: if 
you challenge the conventional wisdom, you will find ways to do things 
much better than they are currently done. (pp. 97-98) 
Wanting to ensure that statistical analyses were done, and done 
right, Beane hired DePodesta to study player performances with the 
aid of a computer. Some of Lewis's most hilarious passages illustrate 
the debate between old baseball wisdom and statistical knowledge: 
"The guy's an athlete, Billy," the old scout says. "There's a lot of upside 
there." 
"He can't hit," says Billy. 
"He's not that bad a hitter," says the old scout. 
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"Yeah, what happens when he doesn't know a fastball is coming?" says 
Billy. 
"He's a tools guy," says the old scout ... 
"But can he hit?" asks Billy. 
"He can hit," says the old scout, unconvincingly. 
Paul reads the player's college batting statistics. They contain a 
conspicuous lack of extra base hits and walks. 
"My only question is," says Billy, "if he's that good a hitter why doesn't 
he hit better?" ... 
Over and over the old scouts will say, "The guy has a great body," or, 
"This guy may be the best body in the draft." And every time they do, 
Billy will say, "We're not selling jeans here," and deposit yet another 
highly touted player, beloved by the scouts, onto his shit list. (p. 30) 
Beane ends up seeking, and getting, young players that other 
teams simply do not want. These were people largely ignored by the 
professional scouts, typically because they had something wrong with 
them - they did not match up with the scouts' mental prototype of a 
successful ballplayer. Consider, for example, the star pitcher Barry 
Zito, passed over by other teams because of his slow fastball, but 
chosen by Beane on the basis of statistics: "Billy made us take Zito," 
the oldest of the scouts confessed (p. 39). While scouts on other teams 
were still searching for young players who looked like Beane did in 
high school, DePodesta was busy surfing the Internet. "The evaluation 
of young baseball players," Lewis writes, "had been taken out of the 
hands of old baseball men and placed in the hands of people who had 
what Billy valued most (and what Billy didn't have), a degree in 
something other than baseball" (p. 41). 
The statistical method was the only way for Beane to solve a 
serious problem: obtaining first-rate talent without a lot of money. 
After all, the New York Yankees had three times the budget of the 
Oakland Athletics. And if Beane did find good players, and they 
performed well, they would be bid away by richer teams. Owing to his 
low payroll, he would be forced to replace his own greatest successes. 
In 2001, Oakland won 102 games in the regular season, the second­
highest total in baseball. They lost three players widely regarded as 
their best, and they were expected by many to have a catastrophic fall. 
Instead they used statistical methods to try to replace the lost players 
with new ones who would provide statistical equivalents - and they 
ended up winning 103 games, the most in baseball that year. Their 
payroll for the year was $34 million, less than half that of their division 
rivals the Seattle Mariners. In Lewis's account, Beane was able to 
succeed because "the market for baseball players was so inefficient, 
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and the general grasp of sound baseball strategy so weak, that superior 
management could still run circles around taller piles of cash" (p. 122). 
II. RATIONALITY AND COMPETITION 
Lewis has a wonderful story to tell, and he tells it wonderfully. His 
account of Beane's success is punctuated by descriptions of numerous 
colorful characters, among them a promising fat catcher dumbfounded 
by Beane's interest in him, an excellent pitcher whose fastball is 
extremely slow, and of course Beane himself. Lewis also raises some 
serious puzzles that he does not resolve, and his account has some 
large and perhaps profound implications that he does not much 
explore. Baseball is an extremely competitive market, and teams have 
a great deal to gain from winning more games. Beane's success, and 
the blunders of many of his colleagues, suggests the persistence of 
boundedly rational behavior in a domain in which market pressures 
might well have been expected to eliminate them. 
A. Why Do Executives Make Mistakes? 
Why do professional baseball executives, many of whom have 
spent their lives in the game, make so many colossal mistakes? They 
are paid well, and they are specialists. They have every incentive to 
evaluate talent correctly. So why do they blunder? In an intriguing 
passage, Lewis offers three clues. First, those who played the game 
seem to overgeneralize from personal experience: "People always 
thought their own experience was typical when it wasn't." Second, the 
professionals were unduly affected by how a player had performed 
most recently, even though recent performance is not always a good 
guide. Third, people were biased by what they saw, or thought they 
saw, with their own eyes. This is a real problem, because the human 
mind plays tricks, and because there is "a lot you couldn't see when 
you watched a baseball game" (p. 18). 
Several findings in cognitive psychology help explain Lewis's clues. 
In making judgments, people tend to use the "availability heuristic."6 
As Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have shown, people often 
assess the probability of an event by asking whether relevant examples 
are cognitively "available" - the sense that they come readily to 
mind.7 Thus, people are likely to think that more words, on a random 
page, end with the letters "ing" than have "n" as their next to last 
letter - even though a moment's reflection will show that this could 
6. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 11-14 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
7. See id. 
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not possibly be the case.8 It follows, from the availability heuristic, that 
recent events will have more salience than less recent ones - one of 
Beane's explicit claims. Now, it is not dumb to use the availability 
heuristic. Heuristics are used because they are, on average, helpful. 
Yet reliable statistical evidence will outperform the availability 
heuristic every time. In using data rather than professional intuitions, 
Beane confirmed this point. 
Consider next Lewis's suggestion that people believed, falsely, that 
their own experience "was typical." This is also a prominent finding in 
studies of human judgment: People systematically exaggerate the 
extent to which others are like they are.9 To illustrate this in class one 
year, one of us asked students whether they owned a cell phone, and 
also to guess what percentage of their classmates owned cell phones. 
As expected, cell-phone owners guessed a higher percentage of cell­
phone ownership than nonowners. This bias in judgment is 
undoubtedly connected with the availability heuristic, because one's 
own behavior is always available and salient (and, like the availability 
heuristic, often useful). But the belief in the typicality of one's own 
behavior is not simply about availability; it is a distinctive kind of bias. 
Above all, perhaps, Lewis's tale demonstrates the use (and vices) 
of the representativeness heuristic.10 Baseball scouts use that heuristic 
by relying on a prototypical picture of a promising prospect - one 
that has a certain physique, a set of "tools," even the Good Face - in 
a way that leads to systematic errors. Perhaps the most famous 
example of the representativeness heuristic involves the likely career 
of a hypothetical woman named Linda, described as follows:11 "Linda 
is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice and also participated in antinuclear 
demonstrations." Researchers asked people to rank, in order of 
probability, eight possible futures for Linda. Six of these futures were 
fillers (e.g., psychiatric social worker, elementary school teacher); the 
two crucial ones were "bank teller" and "bank teller and active in the 
feminist movement." Most people said that Linda was less likely to be 
a bank teller than to be a bank teller and active in the feminist 
movement. This is an obvious logical mistake, a conjunction error, in 
8. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The 
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 4, at 
19, 21. 
9. See Lee Ross et al., The False Consensus Effect: An Egocentric Bias in Social 
Perception and Attribution Processes, J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 279-301 (1977). 
10. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited, in CHOICES, 
VALUES, AND FRAMES (2003). 
11. See id.; Barbara Mellers et al., Do Frequency Representations Eliminate Conjunction 
Effects?, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 269
0 
(2001). 
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which characteristics A and B are thought to be more likely than 
characteristic A alone. The error stems from the representativeness 
heuristic: Linda's description seems to match "bank teller and active in 
the feminist movement" far better than "bank teller." In an 
illuminating reflection on the example, one that bears on baseball and 
many personnel decisions, Stephen Jay Gould observed that "I know 
[the right answer], yet a little homunculus in my head continues to 
jump up and down, shouting at me - 'but she can't just be a bank 
teller; read the description.' "12 
In Lewis's account, baseball scouts rely on a prototype of a good 
player, and they ask, too often, whether a prospect fits the prototype, 
instead of asking whether he is likely to produce runs (pp. 24-34). 
Beane himself was a prototype of the prototype: "Great body, plus 
wheels, plus arm, good instincts, and the ability to hit the ball over 
light towers" (p. 41). The problem was that Beane, like many who fit 
the mold, couldn't succeed at the major-league level. Instead of 
emphasizing what players look like, Beane endorsed "performance 
scouting" (p. 38), based not on "what you can see" the player "doing 
in your mind's eye" (p. 38), but on the player's statistics. 
Beane's preference for performance scouting, as opposed to 
prototype-based scouting, fits quite neatly with a recent discussion of 
the representativeness heuristic by Kahneman and Frederick, who 
emphasize the relevance of dual-process theories of cognition.1 3 Those 
theories distinguish between two families of cognitive operations, 
sometimes labeled System I and System II. System I is intuitive; it is 
rapid, automatic, and effortless (and it features Gould's homunculus). 
System II, by contrast, is reflective; it is slower, self-aware, calculative, 
and deductive. Kahneman and Frederick suggest that System I 
proposes quick answers to problems of judgment, and that System II 
operates as a monitor, confirming or overriding those judgments. Old­
fashioned scouts, stressing the "mind's eye," use System I. Beane 
insists on a System II override, based on one thing: "Paul's computer" 
(p. 37). 
B. Why Not Earlier Beanes? 
But the evident usefulness of Paul's computer raises an even larger 
puzzle. Why didn't someone like Beane come along sooner? Why 
didn't baseball executives start using statistics a decade, or two 
decades, or three decades, earlier? Why have falsehoods and mistakes 
persisted? The economic stakes are extremely high, after all, and if 
12. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL 
HISTORY 469 (1991). 
13. See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 10. For an overview, see DUAL-PROCESS 
THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999). 
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Lewis is correct, the management of most baseball teams could have 
saved many millions of dollars simply by making more rational 
personnel decisions. Here, then, is a situation in which boundedly 
rational behavior persisted even though the economic stakes were 
significant. Market pressures did not drive out that behavior. Nor was 
the important information hard to find. James's arguments have been 
around for nearly two decades. In a market as competitive as major­
league baseball, surely the information should have been used, and 
fast. What went wrong? The question has general importance: Will 
markets usually ensure rational behavior, or can a form of quasi­
rationality1 4 last in some situations even with strong economic 
incentives? 
The initial problem is not that baseball professionals are stupid; it 
is that they are human. Like most people, including experts, they tend 
to rely on simple rules of thumb, on traditions, on habits, on what 
other experts seem to believe. Even when the stakes are high, rational 
behavior does not always emerge. Researchers who have studied 
expert decisionmaking have often replicated the same biases that 
psychologists had earlier illustrated with laboratory studies of college 
students. For example, physicians have been shown to display 
overconfidence, and security analysts issue biased forecasts.1 5 It takes 
time and effort to switch from simple intuitions to careful assessments 
of evidence. This point helps to explain why baseball owners have 
been slow to copy Beane's approach. But at least they are starting. 
The Toronto Blue Jays and the Boston Red Sox have hired general 
managers who follow Beane's general approach. And, in one of the 
longest-overdue moves in baseball, the general manager of the Red 
Sox, appointed when just twenty-eight years old, hired James as a 
consultant. 
C. Lesson 1: The Problem of Bad Statistics 
Many of the lessons in this book apply in domains far from 
baseball. One involves the harmful repercussions of using bad 
statistics or performance measures. We have already seen that batting 
average and RBis can lead teams in unfortunate directions. Consider 
also the case of the "save" statistic. A save is awarded to a relief 
pitcher who comes in near the end of a close game with his team 
ahead and "saves" the win for his team. Most thoughtful observers 
realized long ago that this is a really dumb statistic. Why should 
14. See RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1993). 
15. See Werner DeBondt & Richard Thaler, Do Analysts Overreact, in HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES, supra note 4, at 678; Derek J. Koehler et al., The Calibration of Expert Judgment, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 4, at 686. 
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pitching the last inning of a game have any special significance? A 
pitcher who comes in to pitch the sixth inning of a tied game and 
pitches three scoreless innings has done something much more 
important than one who just pitches the ninth inning, protecting a 
three-run lead. Now, a dumb statistic could be harmless, but in this 
case, as is often true, the very fact that the number is collected and 
tabulated ends up influencing behavior. The existence of the "save" 
statistic (and the muddled thinking that goes along with it, namely, the 
idea that runs scored at the end of the game count more) seems to 
have altered the way teams use their relief pitchers. In the past twenty 
years, most teams have settled on using their best relief pitcher in a 
specific role that has acquired a name: the closer. The closer typically 
comes in just to pitch the ninth inning in close games with his team 
ahead. Though this strategy is nearly universally used, it is clearly 
stupid. A team that is ahead by three runs going into the ninth inning 
has a 97 percent chance of winning the game (a percentage that has 
not changed since the advent of the closer).16 It makes more sense to 
use your best relief pitcher in more crucial situations, such as a tied 
game. Saving a three-run lead is much easier than protecting a tie, 
since you can give up two runs and still win the game. 
What should a team do if it figures this out? One strategy would be 
to take your best reliever and use him more strategically, sometimes in 
the seventh inning of a close game with the best players of the other 
team due to bat, other times with a one-run lead in the ninth. This 
strategy would win more games, but it would not create many "saves" 
for the ace. Beane did this, but he also did something deviously clever: 
he created closers in order to sell them. As Lewis puts it: 
Established closers were systematically overpriced, in large part because 
of the statistic by which closers were judged in the marketplace: 'saves.' 
The very word made the guy who achieved them seem vitally 
important .... You could take a slightly above average pitcher and drop 
him into the closer's role, let him accumulate some gaudy number of 
saves, and then sell him off. You could, in essence, buy a stock, pump it 
up with false publicity, and sell it off for much more than you paid for it. 
(p. 125) 
It is interesting to speculate about the possibility that similar 
phenomena occur in other domains. Consider the role of citation 
counts in the academic labor market. While the hard copy edition of 
the Social Science Citation Index has existed for years, citations have 
become more salient in recent years because of the advent of web­
based citation search engines, including LEXIS and WESTLA W. We 
speculate, partly on the basis of the experience of one of us (Sunstein), 
that legal scholars are now reacting to this rise in the prominence of 
16. Thanks to Bill James for providing these facts. 
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citation counts. In law, another example is placements in top law 
reviews. This is a flawed proxy for quality, to say the least, but lateral 
appointments are often affected by them. 
D. The Difficulty of Organizational Change 
Beane's use of relief pitchers, and his success in general, bear on a 
more general problem. To what extent are the top managers in an 
organization - here the owners and the general managers - able to 
push a rational but radical change down through an organization? 
Beane has an owner who is sympathetic to his philosophy, but if he 
wants to try something new, such as using the relief-ace flexibly, he 
has to convince the field manager to implement his strategy. He also 
has to avoid a rebellion by the players. To get his manager to use the 
player Beane thinks is his most effective pitcher in tight situations, 
Beane tells the manager to think of him as the closer before the ninth 
inning. A relief ace would likely complain about being used in the 
optimal manner, because he would accumulate fewer saves and thus 
would be worth less on the open market. Similarly, suppose a player 
takes more pitches in an attempt to draw more walks and as a result 
increases his on-base percentage at the cost of lowering his batting 
average. His team might like this trade-off, but if it lowered his value 
to other teams, then the player might suffer in the free-agent market. 
Finally, there is the impact of the media and the fans. When James 
was hired by the Red Sox last winter, there was great anticipation 
about how the team would deal with relief pitchers. The rational 
strategy of using pitchers to maximize the chance of winning the game 
was quickly dubbed "bullpen by committee" by Boston sportswriters, 
who knew (from The Book, naturally) that this was a terrible idea. 
When Red Sox relievers lost the opening-day game to the woeful 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays and suffered through an awful opening month, 
James was viewed as the villain. Of course, James does not advocate 
bad pitching, and, presumably with his help, the team has acquired 
three new relief pitchers. But, interestingly, they designated one as 
their closer, perhaps deciding to let this particular battle wait for 
another day. 
The difficulty of achieving sensible change in organizations is 
hardly special to baseball. If a new CEO comes in and wants to change 
how things are done, a selling job must be performed all the way down 
the organizational ladder. Every institution has organizational norms, 
ways of doing things (the in-house version of The Book) that are hard 
to overcome. The new guy is told, well, we don't do things that way 
here. If the CEO forces his views down the organizational ladder and 
his methods are unconventional, then lower-level workers may face 
the same dilemma as the player trying to get more walks. Do they 
maximize their value to the current CEO or to the outside world? 
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E. Bad Equilibrium 
As we have emphasized, Lewis's account bears more generally on 
the performance of markets. He often refers to the inefficiency of the 
market for player talent, as the example of the closer illustrates. If it 
were not for this inefficiency, Beane would not be able to procure a 
winning team while spending one-third as much as the Yankees and 
one-half as much as his division rivals. How can this market be so 
inefficient? Simply put, the baseball owners seem to have evolved into 
a "bad equilibrium." Cascade effects might well be involved: People 
rely on the apparent judgments of others, believing that they carry 
information, even if those other judgments are themselves a product, 
much of the time, of the apparent judgments of others.17 Teams have 
thought the same way for years; The Book has never been revised; and 
so there are massive inefficiencies that have been relatively easy for 
Beane to exploit. You do not need a Harvard economics graduate to 
realize that "a walk is as good as a hit," an expression that was around 
well before James started writing. Beane's key insight was that this 
market was inefficient and could therefore be exploited. Now that 
Beane has succeeded, it is likely that the market for baseball-player 
talent will get more competitive. Still, it is embarrassing that it took so 
long for this to happen, especially for those who think that competitive 
markets always lead to a rational allocation of resources. 
What does this tell us about other markets? Lewis poses this 
question: "If professional baseball players could be over- or 
undervalued, who couldn't? Bad as they may have been, the statistics 
used to evaluate baseball players were probably far more accurate 
than anything used to measure the value of people who didn't play 
baseball for a living" (p. 72). Right! On the basis of first principles, the 
market for baseball players should be one of the most efficient labor 
markets on earth. It is hard to think of any high-paid profession in 
which performance is measured so precisely - and is publicly 
available to every other potential employer. 
Compare the market for baseball players with the market for 
corporate executives. A company looking for a new director of 
human-resource management would be hard-pressed to get any 
objective data on the past performance of job candidates. Instead, 
such a company would be forced to make choices based on interviews 
with the candidates - a process that is even less accurate than the one 
the old scouts use to size up a high-school player. Interviews are 
17. For a helpful overview, see Sushi! Bikchandani et al., Learning From the Behavior of 
Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998). 
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notoriously imperfect predictors of future job performance.18 In many 
contexts their predictive value is essentially zero. 
The biases caused by labor markets using subjective evaluations 
instead of objective measures of output are potentially huge. We can 
glimpse the scope of the problem by studying one subjective variable 
that most people would say should be irrelevant to accurate job 
evaluations in most positions: physical beauty. Away from places such 
as the back lots of Hollywood and the runways of Milan, most of us 
who do not look like Ben Affleck or Jennifer Lopez would like to 
think that successful people get where they do because of their 
accomplishments, not their attractiveness. Alas, it ain't so. To take one 
simple example, height matters: in the United States, the taller 
presidential candidate has usually won. And beauty matters in 
domains where we might not expect it to matter: law and business.19 In 
both fields, and for both sexes, career success and earnings are 
correlated with good looks. 
And consider another problem. We have said that interviews, 
especially unstructured interviews, are not very useful predictors of 
job performance - except that once you have conducted an interview, 
it is almost impossible to avoid the conclusion that you have learned a 
lot. But the facts are clear: unstructured interviews are nearly useless 
at predicting anything except whether the interviewer will 
subsequently like the interviewee.20 So a rational Beane-like strategy 
would be to interview only employees who will work directly with you 
and otherwise make all decisions based on objective criteria and 
statistical models. Rather than conduct interviews, firms should give 
tests and pay more attention to grades in school (a good predictor of 
both intelligence and diligence, admirable traits in nearly any job). 
Numerous law firms and law faculties place great weight on relatively 
unstructured interviews, thinking that as a result of such interviews, 
they learn a great deal about likely performance. But this is probably a 
18. Some authors find that interviews are nearly useless, see, for example, John E. 
Hunter & Ronda F. Hunter, Validity and Utility of Alternative Predictors of Job 
Performance, 96 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72, 90 (1984). Others find that if the interview is 
"structured" it can provide some limited value. See Michael McDaniel et al., The Validity of 
Employment Interviews: A Comprehensive Review and Meta-Analysis, 79 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 599 (1994). 
19. Daniel Hamermesh has produced a series of papers on this topic. See Daniel 
Hammermesh, Beauty Papers, 
http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Hamermesh/Beautystuff.htm (last visited June 1, 2004). 
For published versions, see Daniel Hamermesh et al., Dress for Success: Does Primping 
Pay?, 9 LAB. ECON. 361 (2002); Daniel Hamermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty, Productivity 
and Discrimination: Lawyers' Looks and Lucre, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 172 (1998); Daniel 
Hamermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Market, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1174 
(1994). 
20. See McDaniel et al., supra note 18. 
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blunder. In fact the representativeness heuristic undoubtedly affects 
evaluations, leading firms and law schools to rely, much of the time, on 
a prototype of the successful lawyer or teacher. Their own homunculus 
boldly announces that the interviewee is or is not "right" for the job. 
Most of the time, they would do better to ignore the homunculus and 
to place greater weight on actual performance measures. 
Emboldened by Lewis and Beane, both of us have tried to 
encourage our respective divisions at the University of Chicago to 
reduce the time and weight devoted to the interview process and to 
rely instead on other measures. To date, the effort has been 
repudiated by numerous highly articulate homunculi (otherwise 
known as colleagues and admissions officers). But in many contexts, 
more objective procedures would not only improve accuracy; they 
would also reduce discrimination, inadvertent or otherwise, based on 
factors such as race, gender, or beauty.21 Symphony orchestras have 
found that if they conduct auditions with the candidates hidden behind 
a screen, more women are hired.22 And when employees are hired, 
firms should seek objective measures of performance, which 
distinguish luck from skill. 
CONCLUSION 
Some enlightened organizations, like the Boston Red Sox and the 
Toronto Blue Jays, are undoubtedly taking steps along these lines. 
Many more should be doing so. One of the noteworthy features of 
Lewis's book is his clear demonstration of the pervasiveness of 
boundedly rational behavior even when the stakes are high and even 
when market pressures might be expected to supply a corrective. We 
suspect that countless areas of enterprise, both private and 
governmental, would benefit from their own Billy Beanes and Paul 
DePodestas, challenging widespread intuitions, or what "everyone 
knows," with statistical information about what works and what does 
not, and with performance measures that more accurately reflect the 
true contribution to organizational success. Baseball is not the only 
realm for which The Book is in need of revision. 
21. Cf Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More 
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 
AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming). 
22. Claudia Goldin & Ceclia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind" 
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000). 
